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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PAMELA GIBBY, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
RICHARD GIBBY, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Case No. 20070596-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from an Order of the Honorable Fred D. Howard of the Fourth 
Judicial District Court for Utah County, State of Utah. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 
78A-4- 103(h) and Q) (2008 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The only issue preserved by the parties on appeal is whether the trial court committed 
error in granting the Appellee's Motion in Limine. As it relates to a challenge of the trial 
court's factual findings, the appellate court will not disturb a trial court's factual findings 
unless they are clearly erroneous. Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 1991) 
(citing Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1989)). In challenging factual 
findings, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings even when 
viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below. Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177 (Utah 
2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("A party 
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged 
finding.1'). To fulfill the duty to marshal, the Appellant is required to "present... every scrap 
of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings [she] resists." 
Chen, supra at 1177. This Court reviews legal determinations made by the trial court for 
correctness. See, Classic Cabinets, Inc. v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 978 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 
1999). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The Appellee does not contend that there are any determinative constitutional 
provisions, statutes, ordinances or rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After the Corrected Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree were entered in 
this matter on March 17, 2000, the Appellee, Richard Gibby, filed a petition to modify 
certain provisions of the Corrected Decree on August 25, 2004. On August 30, 2004, the 
Appellant, Pamela Gibby, filed and served an affidavit in support of an order to show. In the 
relevant portion of her affidavit, Pamela Gibby sought judgment against the Appellee, 
Richard Gibby, for certain obligations contained in trust deeds and notes that the Appellee, 
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Richard Gibby, never signed. 
Both in a separate civil action and in this proceeding, the trial courts have determined 
that, as a matter of law, Richard Gibby has no obligation to Pamela Gibby under the terms 
of the trust deeds and notes outlined in Paragraph 14 of the Corrected Decree of Divorce that 
he did not sign. The only issue preserved on this appeal is the propriety of Judge Howard's 
ruling granting the Appellee's motion in limine precluding, as a matter of law, the Appellant, 
Pamela Gibby's claims related thereto. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In order to provide a better presentation of the facts relevant to the adjudication of this 
appeal, the Appellee has divided the facts into three areas. First, the facts relating to how the 
parties chose to divide the real property during the course of the original divorce proceedings 
will be presented. Second, the attempt, by the Appellant, to seek judgment against the 
Appellee in a separate civil action, for obligations allegedly incurred in the divorce case, 
from the real property, will be traced. Third, the claims of the Appellant in her order to 
show cause in this proceeding will be outlined. Fourth and finally, the facts relevant to the 
Appellee's motion in limine seeking to preclude any further action against Appellee on the 
obligations relating to the real property, previously held by the parties, will be presented. 
A. Division of the Real Property under the Terms of the Corrected 
Decree 
1. The sole issue raised by the Appellant in her appeal stems from the division of 
3 
the real property of the parties when the Corrected Decree of Divorce was entered in this 
matter on March 17, 2000 (R. 102-112). A copy of the Corrected Decree of Divorce is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 
2. It is undisputed that the Appellee, Richard Gibby, was unrepresented in the 
original divorce proceedings (R. 1-124). The Appellant, Pamela Gibby, on the other hand, 
has been represented by counsel throughout the proceedings. Id. It was counsel for the 
Appellant who prepared the Verified Amended Stipulation and Property Settlement 
Agreement upon which the Corrected Decree of Divorce was based (R. 29-41). 
3. It was the Appellant and her counsel who chose and facilitated the method by 
which the real property of the parties was divided. The manner chosen is revealed by the 
terms of the Corrected Decree, attached hereto as Exhibit "A." Paragraph 12 of the Corrected 
Decree awards the Appellant, Pamela Gibby, the marital home of the parties located at 49 
North Country Lane, Orem, Utah and one-half of the net proceeds from the sale of the 
parties' property located at 855 N. Freedom Blvd., Provo, Utah. The Appellee, Richard 
Gibby, was awarded, in Paragraph 12 of the Corrected Decree, the remaining six properties 
of the parties plus one-half of the net proceeds from the sale of the parties' property located 
at 855 N. Freedom Blvd., Provo, Utah (R. 106-9). 
4. Paragraph 12 of the Corrected Decree is clear that the value attributed to the 
real property awarded to the Appellant, Pamela Gibby, was $355,000.00 and that the value 
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of the property awarded to the Appellee, Richard Gibby, was $1,552,500.00. In 
subparagraph "C" of Paragraph 12, it states: 
To equalize the distribution of marital property to the parties, the parties have 
agreed that Respondent will sign Promissory notes to Petitioner (see 
Equalizing Payment, below). 
R. 106-9. 
Paragraph 14 of the Corrected Decree then provided: 
14. To equalize the marital real property settlement between the parties, the 
parties have agreed that: 
A. Respondent [Appellee Richard Gibby] or the appropriate LLC, 
is hereby ordered to sign a Promissory note to Petitioner 
[Appellant Pamela Gibby] in the sum of $390,000 secured by a 
trust deed in the same amount on the property at 363 N., (sic) 
University Avenue, Provo Utah 84601. The terms of the note 
will include a 7% interest rate on the principle amortized for 20 
years. Payments on the note will be made to Petitioner on the 1st 
of each month beginning June 1, 1999 [eleven (11) months 
before the Court signed the Amended Decree of Divorce] 
(Emphasis added). 
R. 106-9. 
6. Subparagraphs "B" and "C" of Paragraph 14 of the Corrected Decree provide 
similarly that the Respondent, Richard Gibby or the appropriate LLC, should sign a 
promissory note in the amounts of $50,000 and $90,750 respectively, to be secured by trust 
deeds. Id. 
5 
7. As allowed by the Corrected Decree, Richard Gibby neither signed the 
Promissory Notes nor the Trust Deeds in a personal capacity. Rather, the parties opted to 
have the Defendant sign the documents in his representative capacity, as a managing partner, 
of a properly formed and functioning limited liability company, New West Properties, LLC. 
That procedure was not only contemplated, but explicitly allowed, by the language of the 
Amended Decree of Divorce (R. 106-9, 435). 
8. The purpose of the arrangement was to provide the Appellant, Pamela Gibby, 
with the security of an established payment set by the terms of the trust deeds and notes on 
the properties and leave the Appellee, Richard Gibby, with the risks of the real estate market. 
B. Appellant's Civil Action Against the Appellee to Procure a 
Deficiency Judgment 
9. On November 19, 2004, the Appellant Pamela Gibby commenced a separate 
suit against the Appellee, Richard Gibby, in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah 
County, State of Utah, case no. 040403686 (R. 383-85). In her Complaint, Pamela Gibby 
claimed that Richard Gibby had signed a promissory note in her favor for $390,000 secured 
by the property at 363 North University Avenue, Provo, Utah. The promissory note referred 
to was one of the trust deeds and notes included in the Corrected Decree of Divorce. Mrs. 
Gibby alleged that Richard Gibby had defaulted under the terms of the note and that she had 
then concluded a non-judicial foreclosure on August 26, 2004. Mrs. Gibby sought a 
deficiency judgment against Mr Gibby in accordance with the provisions of U.C. A. 57-1 -32. 
6 
Id. 
10. Mr. Gibby filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted on June 
22, 2005. The judgment included an award of $5,400 in attorney fees to Mr. Gibby. In 
relevant part, Judge Fred D. Howard ruled as follows: 
1. The Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and the case is 
dismissed against the Defendant with prejudice. 
2. The Court finds that it is not disputed that the Defendant [Richard 
Gibby] signed all documents on behalf of the LLC and did not sign any 
documents in a personal capacity.. . 
4. The Court finds that the Defendant signed all Notes and documents in 
this matter on behalf of the LLC and did not sign any documents in a 
personal capacity. The Court finds that it is unpersuaded that the 
Defendant bears any personal liability in this matter. . . 
8. The Court finds that the Defendant is entitled to an award of attorney's 
fees in this matter and grants the Defendant a judgment as for his 
attorney's fees in the amount of $5,400.00.. . . 
R. 376-79, Exhibit "B" hereto 
C. Appellant's Claims in her Order to Show Cause 
11. In the affidavit filed in support of her order to show cause, the Appellant, 
Pamela Gibby, requested a wide range of relief under the terms of the Corrected Decree. As 
it relates to this appeal, she requested, once again as she had in the separate civil action, 
judgment against Mr. Gibby under Paragraph 14 of the Corrected Decree, alleging that Mr. 
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Gibby, personally, was ordered to pay her all of the equalizing payments identified in that 
paragraph and that he had failed to do so (R. 129-132, 349-351). 
12. The Appellant, at no time in these proceedings, sought to amend the provisions 
of the Corrected Decree of Divorce. Mrs. Gibby never requested that Judge Howard modify 
the terms of the real property division or the provisions relating to alimony or child support 
(R. 129-132,349-351 and 608-17). 
D. The Disposition of Appellee's Motion in Limine 
13. On April 21,2006, the Appellee Richard Gibby, filed a motion in limine with 
supporting memorandum, seeking a detemiination that the Appellant had no legal claim 
against the Appellee based on Paragraph 14 of the Corrected Decree of Divorce as set out 
in Mrs. Gibby's affidavit (R. 374-400). 
14. By Order entered on July 12,2006, Judge Howard granted Mr. Gibby's Motion 
in Limine and in relevant part, held as follows: 
2. Respondent [Richard Gibby] asserts that Petitioner's [Pamela Gibby] 
claim relating to the $390,000.00 Trust deed note has been adjudicated 
to conclusion against Petitioner in a companion civil case and, based 
upon the principles of claim preclusion, Petitioner is barred from 
relitigating the claim in this action. Respondent argues that he has no 
underlying obligation to Petitioner upon which a judgment could be 
based because he fulfilled the obligations described in Paragraph 14 of 
the [Corrected] Decree by signing a promissory note and trust deed as 
a member and manager of New West Properties, LLC. Additionally, 
Respondent argues lhat Utah's One Action Rule prohibits any further 
action by Petitioner upon debts against the LLC and Respondent related 
to the property in question. 
8 
Petitioner responds that the terms of the Corrected Decree of Divorce 
create an obligation upon Respondent to assure that Petitioner is given 
her fair share of the marital estate. Petitioner argues that Respondent 
has a personal obligation that cannot be transferred to someone else to 
carry the terms of the Decree with respect to his obligation to give to 
Petitioner her fair share of the marital estate. Petitioner argues that 
Respondent's Motion in Limine fails because the issues in the divorce 
case are not the same issues raised and decided in the separate civil 
action between the parties. Petitioner argues that it would be a 
violation of the principles of equity and fairness to allow Respondent 
to liquidate a marital asset and keep for himself the equity which 
rightfully belongs to Petitioner. 
The question before the Court is whether Respondent's action of 
signing a promissory note to Petitioner, on behalf of New West 
Properties, LLC, in the amount of $390,000.00 secured by a trust deed 
in the same amount on the property at 363 N. University Avenue, 
discharged Respondent's obligation to Petitioner as a matter of law. It 
is clear from a review of this matter and the Corrected Divorce Decree 
that the parties were the owners of substantial properties at the time of 
their divorce. By all appearances, the parties intended to divide the 
properties with a fair and equalizing approach. The scheme the parties 
used to divide and equalize their properties included the execution and 
recording of a trust deed. Trust deeds are accompanied by a host of 
legal rights, including rights encompassed in the trust deed statue and 
other rights grounded in case precedent. The Court finds that, by 
tender of the promissory note and trust deed from New West 
Properties, LLC, Petitioner's equitable remedies in the divorce 
action were reduced to legal remedies, many of which remedies are 
superior to other remedies available under the law. 
The Court noted that the Corrected Decree of Divorce was signed by 
the Court and entered on March 17, 2000. The next month, on April 
24,2000, the trust deed contemplated by Paragraph 14 of the Corrected 
Decree and executed on September 2, |999 by Richard Gibby as 
Manager of New West Properties, LLC was recorded by the Utah 
County Recorder's office. The portion of Paragraph 14 of the 
Corrected Decree pertaining to Petitioner's claim in this matter reads 
as follows: 
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To equalize the marital real property settlement between the 
parties: a. Respondent or the appropriate LLC, is hereby ordered 
to sign a Promissory note to Petitioner in the sum of $390,000 
secured by a trust deed in the same amount on the property at 
363 N., (sic) University Avenue, Provo Utah 84601. The terms 
of the note will include a 7% interest rate on the principle 
amortized for 20 years. Payments on the note will be made to 
Petitioner on the 1st of each month beginning June 1, 1999 
(Emphasis in original). 
6. The Court finds that because the Corrected Decree gave 
Respondent the option of either personally signing the Promissory 
Note and trust deed or signing the instruments on behalf of the 
LLC, Respondent fulfilled his obligation to Petitioner when he 
complied with Paragraph 14. In effects [sic], Petitioner has already 
been "paid" her fair share of the marital estate because she elected 
to accept such form of payment which included valuable rights and 
remedies described in the Promissory Note and Trust Deed. 
Furthermore, not only did Petitioner accept the valuable rights 
when she accepted the Promissory Note and Trust Deed from New 
West Properties, LLC, but it is undisputed that she also recognized 
and exercised such rights when she chose to subordinate her 
interest in the University Avenue property and later foreclosure on 
the trust deed. 
7. In reviewing the Corrected Decree, the Court finds that nowhere in the 
decree is there language that suggests an additional personal guaranty 
from Mr. Gibby for the $390,000.00 promissory note amount. The 
Court finds that equitable remedies are no longer available to Petitioner 
with regard to her claim for $390,000.00 because she obtained 
bargained-for legal rights in connection with her claim as described, 
and pursued the legal remedies available to her when she foreclosed on 
the trust deed. (Emphasis added) 
R. 452-56, Exhibit "C" hereto. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
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The Appellant was represented by counsel at all times in these proceedings. Counsel 
for the Appellant drafted the original stipulation, findings, conclusions and decree. 
Subsequently, a corrected version of the documents was drafted by Appellant's counsel, 
signed by the parties and filed with the Court. 
The Corrected Decree explicitly gives the Appellee, Richard Gibby, the right to sign 
the $390,000 promissory note and trust deed personally or in a representative capacity. Upon 
signing the note and trust deed as the managing member of an LLC, the Appellee discharged 
his obligation under Paragraph 14. There is no question in this case that the Appellant, 
Pamela Gibby, is savvy, informed and capable of handling real property issues. She 
navigated herself through a subordination process, a non-judicial foreclosure and a suit 
seeking a deficiency judgment. At no time has the Appellant claimed that the provisions in 
the Corrected Decree relating to the equalizing payment were forced on her, contained 
ambiguous language or were otherwise faulty. 
Any and all rights of the Appellant to proceed under Paragraph 14 of the Corrected 
Decree have been lost based upon the clear wording of the Decree, principles of claim 
preclusion and Utah's one-action rule. 
The Appellant never filed a petition requesting that the trial court amend the 
provisions of the Corrected Decree as it relates to any personal obligation of the Appellee, 
Richaid Gibby. 
Finally, there is no legal basis to challenge Judge Howard's ruling granting the motion 
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in limine and this Court should assess attorney fees against the Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE APPELLANT HAS UTTERLY FAILED TO MARSHALL THE 
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE ORDER GRANTING THE 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
It is very difficult for the Appellee to understand the argument that the Appellant is 
attempting to make on appeal. However, it is clear that Appellant has not set forth a legally 
sufficient challenge to the facts relied upon by Judge Howard in granting the Appellee's 
Motion in Limine. The marshaling rule requires appellants to "'marshal all the evidence in 
favor of the facts as found by the trial court and then demonstrate that even viewing the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support 
the findings of fact.'" Save Our Schools v. Board of Educ., 122 P.3d 611 (Utah 2005) 
(quoting Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004)). If a party fails to marshal the 
evidence, the Court assumes the evidence supports the trial court's findings. See Chen at 
1177. 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure outlines the requirements 
for arguments in briefs submitted to this court: 
The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue 
not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and 
parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first 
marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding. 
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Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9). 
The Court dismisses arguments that do not meet these requirements. See State v. 
Sloan, 72 P.3d 138 (Utah App. 2003) (citing Smith v. Smith, 995 P.2d 14 (Utah App. 1999). 
Particularly, ff[b]riefs must contain reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal authority. 
An issue is inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift 
the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court." Id. 
The Appellant, in her brief, does not attempt to even identify the factual findings that 
Judge Howard made in his ruling granting the Motion in Limine. Therefore, there is no 
attempt by the Appellant, after identifying the underlying pivotal facts, of arguing why the 
adoption of those facts was clearly erroneous or against the weight of the evidence. Further, 
the Appellant has failed to tie an argument to a finding or conclusion of the trial court. 
Accordingly, Appellee respectfully submits that based upon the clear failure of the 
Appellant to marshal the evidence in this case, the Court must accept the underlying facts 
upon which Judge Howard's ruling and order are based. Further, Appellant respectfully 
requests that the Court determine that the Appellant's brief is legally insufficient under Rule 
24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
POINT II: THE PORTIONS OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF REFERENCING 
FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE SHOULD BE STRICKEN. 
Utah R. App. P. 11 identifies the elements of the record on appeal. The Rule states: 
(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers and exhibits filed 
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in the trial court . . . the transcript of proceedings, if any, the index prepared 
by the clerk of the trial court, and the docket sheet, shall constitute the record 
on appeal in all cases . . . 
In this case, the Appellant has not taken any action to augment the record on appeal 
or request the inclusion of matters not identified in Utah R< App. P. 11. However, throughout 
the Appellant's brief on appeal, she fails to cite to the record and/or seeks to include matters 
that are not of record in this case. As outlined above, Utah R. App. P.24(a)(9) requires that 
the argument contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented, "with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." 
On pages 7 and 8 of Appellant's brief, a litany of evidence and documents is listed 
that the Appellant contends that she was prepared to present by way of testimony and/or 
evidence. The Appellant filed only one response to the Motion in Limine in the tnal court 
and not one of the listed items was included or referenced (R. 407-23). Because the 
referenced items are not part of the record on appeal and were never presented to the trial 
court, the Appellant requests that the designated copy of the settlement summary (Appellant's 
Brief, Addendum, Exhibit "B"), the copy of the Subordination Agreement (Appellant's 
Brief, Addendum, Exhibit "C"), the Amendment to the Articles of Organization (Appellant's 
Brief, Addendum, Exhibit "D"), and the deficiency spreadsheet (Appellant's Brief, 
Addendum, Exhibit "E"), be stricken and that all references to the material be excluded by 
the Court from Consideration. 
Appellant, on page 8 of her brief, claims that Richard Gibby was the only member of 
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New West Properties, L.L.C., but the Appellant fails to cite to the record in this case. It is 
presumed that the Appellant is relying on the Amendment to the Articles of Organization of 
the LLC that is also not part of the record in this case but the Appellant does not even include 
a courtesy reference. Although Appellee does not see any relevance to the argument, the 
pattern of making assertions and either not documenting them or authenticating them with 
material that neither the Appellant nor the trial court have seen, constitutes a waste of 
everyone's time and effort. 
Appellee submits that the material relied upon by Appellant that is not a part of the 
record in this case be stricken and that the arguments based thereon be rejected. 
POINT III: THE UNAMBIGUOUS TERMS OF THE CORRECTED 
DECREE MUST BE ENFORCED AS IT IS WRITTEN. 
Appellee submits that the Appellant has simply failed to articulate any acceptable 
legal basis for overturning Judge Howard's ruling granting the motion in limine. The 
Appellant seems to be arguing that there is an underlying principle of fairness and equity that 
trumps the unambiguous terms of an order of the trial court that was engineered and 
approved by the parties (Appellants Brief at 11). If that, in fact, is the Appellant's argument, 
it is contrary to the law in Utah. 
Utah law is clear that a judgment must be enforced as written if the language is clear 
and unambiguous. Park City Utah Corp. v. Ensign Co., 586 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1978). 
However, ambiguous judgments are subject to the same rules of construction that apply to 
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all written instruments and "the entire record may be resorted to for the purpose of construing 
the judgment." Id. The determination of whether a contract is ambiguous is, at the outset, a 
question of law. Regional Sales Agency Inc. v Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210,1213 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). Language is ambiguous if the words suggest two or more plausible meanings. 
Crowtherv. Carter, 161 P.2d 129, 131 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The Appellant did not contend at trial and does not argue in her brief that Paragraph 
14(a) of the Corrected Decree of Divorce is ambiguous. Therefore, the trial court did not 
specifically address ambiguity but Judge Howard did find that the relevant language was 
clear: 
7. In reviewing the Corrected Decree, the Court finds that nowhere in the 
decree is there language that suggests an additional personal guaranty 
from Mr. Gibby for the $390,000.00 promissory note amount. The 
Court finds that equitable remedies are no longer available to Petitioner 
with regard to her claim for $390,000.00 because she obtained 
bargained-for legal rights in connection with her claim as described, 
and pursued the legal remedies available to her when she foreclosed on 
the trust deed. 
R. 452-56, Exhibit "C" hereto. 
Additionally, the language contained in not only Paragraph 14(a) of the Corrected 
Decree, but also subparagraphs "B," "C" and "D" of Paragraph 14, is absolutely clear: 
Respondent [Appellee Richard Gibby] or the appropriate LLC, is hereby 
ordered to sign a Promissory note to Petitioner [Appellant Pamela Gibby] in 
the sum . . . . (Emphasis added) 
R. 106-8. 
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There can be no question that the signing of the trust deed note in a representative 
capacity satisfied the clear language of the decree. Further, there is simply no factual basis 
for the argument that the parties or the trial court intended the obligations described m 
Paragraph 14 to be those of Mr. Gibby, if he signed the relevant documents as a 
representative of the relevant LLC. 
Because the language in the Corrected Decree is clear and unambiguous, the law in 
Utah requires that the language be strictly enforced. As Judge Howard found, the formula 
used by the parties in this case constituted a fair and equitable division. This Court has held 
that it will not disturb property distributions on appeal unless they are unjust or constitute 
a clear abuse of discretion. Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982); Rasband v. 
Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
POINT IV: THE APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT FOR MODIFICATION OF 
THE CORRECTED DECREE BASED UPON A CHANGE IN 
CIRCUMSTANCES IS A NEW ARGUMENT ON APPEAL. 
In Utah, matters not raised in the pleadings nor put in issue at the trial may not be 
raised for the first time on appeal. Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 
1984); Franklin Fin. v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P 2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). A matter 
is sufficiently raised if it has been submitted to the trial court and the trial court has had the 
opportunity to make findings of fact or law. See Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis 
Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982). 'Theories or issues which are not 
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apparent or reasonably discernible from the pleadings, affidavits and exhibits will not be 
considered." Minnehoma Fin. Co. v. Pauli, 565 P.2d 835, 838 (Wyo. 1977). In particular, 
even if pleadings are generously interpreted, if they are not supported by any factual showing 
or by the submission of legal authority, they are not presented for decision. Int'l Business 
Mach. Corp v. Lawhorn, 106 Idaho 194, 677 P.2d 507, 510 (1964). Further, the rule that a 
legal theory may not be raised for the first time on appeal is "to be stringently applied when 
the new theory depends on controverted factual questions whose relevance thereto was not 
made to appear at trial." Bogacki v. Bd of Supervisors, 5 Cal. 3d 771,489 P.2d 537, 543-44, 
97 Cal Rptr. 657 (1971), cert, denied, 405 U.S. 1030, 31 L. Ed. 2d 488, 92 S. Ct 1301 
(1972). 
The Appellant, after making the "fairness" argument proceeds to cite a child custody 
case where a petition to modify had been filed (Appellant's brief at 11-12). The Appellant 
seems to be arguing that the prior ruling in the "deficiency judgment" case has no effect in 
the divorce case because there has been a substantial change in the circumstances of the 
parties. The Appellant then argues on page 13 that since the trial court had continuing 
jurisdiction to address property divisions and because there had been a substantial change, 
the Appellant was entitled to prevail. Id. 
The problem with the argument is that although Richard Gibby filed a Petition to 
Modify to lower his child support and alimony (R. 125-27), the Appellant simply filed an 
order to show cause (R. 128-132, 349-51). Further, there is not a single phrase in either of 
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the affidavits filed by the Appellant that requests a modification of the property division or 
awards of alimony and child support. The Appellant sought only the enforcement of the 
Corrected Decree. 
There is no question that the argument of a modification of the Corrected Decree fails 
because it was not raised directly or indirectly in the pleadings or the hearing on this matter. 
POINT V: APPELLEE HAS NO UNDERLYING OBLIGATION TO 
APPELLANT UPON WHICH A JUDGMENT COULD BE BASED. 
The Appellant's argument is that the Corrected Decree created an explicit or implied 
personal obligation to pay the amounts detailed in Paragraph 14 of the decree. However, as 
repeatedly argued throughout, there is no language in the decree or legal theory to support 
the Appellant's argument. 
The Appellee did not sign the Promissory Note and the Trust Deed to the 363 
North University Avenue Property in a personal capacity. All signatures on the 
document were those of a clearly designated managing partner of a validly formed and 
operating Limited Liability Company. 
The Corrected Decree of Divorce, drafted by Appellant's lawyer, in a proceeding 
where the Appellee was unrepresented by counsel, chose a strategy with regard to the 
division of the real property. Instead of seeking a method to divide the 363 North University 
property by some other means or require the Appellee to sign some note in a personal 
capacity or even sign a guaranty, the Corrected Decree of Divorce, Exhibit "A", gave Mr. 
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Gibby the option. Richard Gibby exercised the option of signing in a representative capacity 
for the LLC. Further from the time the Stipulation was in effect, eleven (11) months before 
the Court signed the Corrected Decree of Divorce to the present day, the appellant has not 
sought to have the Corrected Decree modified or changed in any regard 
The law relating to limited liability companies is statutory. U.C.A. 48-2c-104 (2001 
as Amended) provides that "[a] company formed under this chapter is a legal entity 
distinct from its members."(Emphasis added) U.C.A. 48-2c-601 (2001 as Amended) then 
explicitly then describes the liability of anyone associated with a limited liability company 
as follows: 
Except as provided in Section 48-2c-6025 no organizer, member, manager, or 
employee of a company is personally liable under a judgment, decree, or order 
of a court, or in any other manner, for a debt, obligation, or liability of the 
company or for the acts or omissions of the company or of any other organizer, 
member, manager, or employee of the company. 
The only exception to the general grant of immunity in the statute is contained in 
U.C.A. 48-2c-602 (2001 as Amended). The exception relates only to obligations of a 
member of the IXC to the LLC. The statute states in relevant part: 
The following exception to limited liability under Section 48-2c-601 shall apply: 
(1) All persons who assume to act as a company without complying with this 
chapter are jointly and severally liable for all debts and liabilities so incurred, 
except for debts incurred in the course of prefiling activities authorized 
under Section 48-2c-404. 
(2) A member of a company is liable to the company :(a) for the difference 
between the amount of the member's contributions to the company which have 
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been actually made and the amount which is stated in the operating agreement 
or other contract as having been made; and (b) for any unpaid contribution to 
the company which the member, in the operating agreement or other contract, 
agreed to make in the future at the time and on the conditions stated in the 
operating agreement or other contract. 
(3) A member holds as trustee for the company: (a) specific property which is 
stated in the operating agreement or other contract as having been contributed 
by the member, if the property7 was not contributed or it has been wrongfully 
or erroneously returned; and (b) money or other property wrongfully or 
erroneously paid or conveyed to the member. 
(4) Persons engaged in prefiling activities other than those authorized by 
Section 48-2c-404 shall be jointly and severally liable for any debts or 
liabilities incurred in the course of those activities. 
(5) (a) This chapter does not alter any law applicable to the relationship 
between a person rendering professional services and a person receiving those 
services, including liability arising out of those professional services, (b) All 
persons rendering professional services shall remain personally liable for any 
results of that person's acts or omissions. 
(6) When a member has rightfully received a distribution, in whole or in part, 
of the member's capital account, the member remains liable to the company for 
any sum, not in excess of the amount of distribution, with interest, necessary 
to discharge the company's obligations to all creditors of the company who 
extended credit in reliance on any representation as to the financial condition 
of the company that included the amount so distributed and whose claims arose 
prior to the distribution. 
U.C.A. 2c-603 (2001 as Amended) provides that even the exceptions to the general 
liability can be waived by the other members of the LLC. 
Dispositive of the issues in this case, U.C.A. 48-2c-l 16 (2001 as Amended) provides 
that "[a] member or manager of a company is not a proper party to proceedings by or 
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against a company, except when the object is to enforce a member's or manager's right 
against, or liability to, the company."(emphasis added). 
The statute was interpreted in Dygert v Collier, 2004 WL 253554 (Utah App 2004). 
The Court relying on the statutes stated that, 
. . . the genera) rule is that a corporation [using corporation law to interpret 
U.C.A. 48-2c-601, 104 and 116] is an entity separate and distinct from its 
officers, shareholders and directors and that they will not be held personally 
liable for the corporation's debts and obligations. Reedeker v. Salisbury\ 952 
P.2d 577, 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted). Similarly, a director is 
not personally liable for his corporation's contractual breaches unless he 
assumed personal liability, acted in bad faith or committed a tort in connection 
with performance of the contract. . . even where the director, while acting in 
his official capacity, took actions that resulted in the breach. . . . 
Id. 
In this case, the facts established that the Appellee clearly signed the Promissory Note 
and Trust Deed in a representative capacity, acting on behalf of the LLC. As such, he is 
protected from liability by the statute and the interpretive case law in the state of Utah. 
Further the statutes give the Appellee the right to be insulated from being a party to an 
action to enforce a debt against the LLC. U.C.A. 48-2c-l 16 (2001 as Amended). 
Based thereon, it is respectfully submitted that there is simply no viable legal theory 
on which the Appellant would be entitled to recover and the trial court acted properly in 
granting the motion in limine. 
POINT VI: THE ONE ACTION RULE PROHIBITS ANY FURTHER ACTION 
BY THE APPELLANT AGAINST THE LLC AND THE APPELLEE 
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ON OBLIGATIONS RELATED TO THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION, 
Because Mr. Gibby did not sign in a personal capacity and because there are no 
independent theories of liability, the Appellant is restncted to those pertaining to the non-
judicial foreclosure of real property. 
It is undisputed that a non-judicial foreclosure of the property was concluded 
(Plaintiffs Complaint, paras 7-11, R. 3 83-85). The allegations in the Complaint mirror Utah 
Code Annotated 57-1-32 (1953 as Amended, which provides in relevant part as follows: 
At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust deed 
as provided in Sections 57-1-23, 57-1-24, and 57-1-27, an action may be 
commenced to recover the balance due upon the obligation for which the 
trust deed was given as security, and in that action the complaint shall set 
forth the entire amount of the indebtedness that was secured by the trust deed, 
the amount for which the property was sold, and the fair market value of the 
property at the date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the 
fair market value of the property at the date of sale. The court may not render 
judgment for more than the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness 
with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's 
fees, exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the date of the sale. In 
any action brought under this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to 
collect its costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred. (Emphasis added). 
However, the right to proceed against real property is limited by LLC.A. 78-37-1 
(1953 as Amended), which provides, 
There can be but one action for the recovery of any debt or the 
enforcement of any right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate 
which action must be in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. 
Judgment shall be given adjudging the amount due, with costs and 
disbursements, and the sale of mortgaged property, or some part thereof, to 
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satisfy said amount and accruing costs, and directing the sheriff to proceed and 
sell the same according to the provisions of law relating to sales on execution, 
and a special execution or order of sale shall be issued for that purpose. 
(Emphasis added). 
The one-action rule has been extended by the Utah Appellate Courts to trust deeds. 
Utah Mortgage & loan Co. v. Black, 618 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1980). Of course, the function 
of the one-action rule is to, 
eliminate harassment of debtors and multiple litigation which sometimes 
occurred under the common law rule which allowed a creditor to foreclose and 
sell the land and sue on the note. . . . 
Lockhart v. Equitable Realty Inc, 657 P.2d 1333, 1335 (Utah 1983) (citing Utah Mortgage 
& Loan, supra, at 45. 
Inasmuch as the Appellee has no independent liability to the Appellant in this matter 
and all responsibility for the debt alleged by the Plaintiff originated with the Promissory7 Note 
and Trust Deed, the Plaintiff is limited 1o the process described above, which by definition, 
includes only the parties to the Note and Trust Deed. That list of parties excludes 
categorically, Mr. Gibby. Based thereon, the trial court ruled properly in granting the Motion 
i8n Limine. 
POINT VII: THE APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF 
JUDGE HOWARD'S RULING IN THE CIVIL DEFICIENCY ACTION 
BASED UPON PRINCIPLES OF CLAIM PRECLUSION. 
The Appellant does not dispute that Judge Howard, in his ruling and order in the 
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deficiency case, granted Mr. Gibby's motion for summary judgment (R* 376-79, Exhibit "B" 
hereto). 
It is the Appellee's position that the ruling is binding on the determination of the issues 
in this case. Although the Court, in a divorce action, has equitable powers, it was the 
Appellant who engineered the divorce settlement to give Mr. Gibby the option of not 
becoming personally liable on the notes. As argued above, the Appellant is not seeking an 
amendment to the Corrected Decree; rather, she is seeking only enforcement of the terms 
thereof. Accordingly, the function of the Court in this proceeding is that of interpreting the 
language contained in the Corrected Decree and not rendering equitable relief 
The fact is that in every divorce action, the parties and the courts do their best to 
fashion an equitable property settlement However, neither the courts nor the opposing parties 
are guarantors of that resolution. Real property can go down in value. People occupying real 
property can have situations arise that result in defaults under the terms of a trust deed or 
mortgage. Appellant was well aware of the risks that both parties faced under the model 
engineered by the Appellant. Mr. Gibby has also been severely affected by market values and 
the actions of others that have wreaked havoc with the value of properties he received in the 
Corrected Decree. 
The basic principles of res judicata encompass both claim preclusion and issue 
preclusion. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 73 P.3d 325 (Utah 2003) (citing Salt Lake City v. 
Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1995)), Claim preclusion involves the 
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same parties or their privies and the same cause of action. It" 'precludes the relitigation of all 
issues that could have been litigated as well as those that were, in fad, litigated in the prior 
action.1 " Maoris & Assocs. v. Neways, Inc., 16 P.3d 1214 (Utah 2000) (quoting Schaer v. 
State, 657 P.2d 1337,1340 (Utah 1983) (citation omitted))(emphasis added). Issue preclusion 
or collateral estoppel, "arises from a different cause of action and prevents parties or their 
privies from relitigating facts and issues in the second suit that were fully litigated in the first 
suit." Id. In effect, once a party has had his or her day in court and won or lost, it does not get 
a second chance to prevail on the same issues. Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246, 249 (Utah 
App.1987). 
The Utah Court of Appeals outlined the test to be applied in determining if claims of 
the parties are precluded in Youren v Tintic School District, 86 P.3d 771 (Utah App.,2004): 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the claim that 
is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or must be one that 
could and should have been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit must have 
resulted in a final judgment on the merits. Macris & Assocs. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 
93,^ j 20, 16 P.3d 1214 (quotations and citations omitted). 'All three elements must be 
established for claim preclusion to apply." Miller, 2002 UT 6 at % 58, 44 P.3d 663. 
Youren concedes that the first element is satisfied. Under the second element, 
Youren's "claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first 
suit or must be one that could and should have been raised in the first action." 
Macris & Assocs., 2000 UT 93 at 120,16 P.3d 1214 (emphasis added) (quotations and 
citations omitted). In several portions of her brief, Youren admits that she ff could 
have" brought her first cause of action in the prior suit Further, she should have 
brought it in the prior suit because it is based upon the same set of operative facts 
alleged in that suit. Therefore, the second element is satisfied. The third element, 
which requires that "the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits," 
is also satisfied. Id. (quotations and citations omitted). The fact that a portion of the 
final judgment in the prior suit is pending appeal does not affect the finality of the 
judgment for purposes of res judicata. See Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 
P.2d 387, 390 (Utah Ct.App.1987) ( " A judgment or order, once rendered, is final for 
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purposes of res judicata until reversed on appeal or modified or set aside in the court 
of rendition."). Because all three elements are satisfied, we conclude that the trial 
court properly dismissed Youren's first cause of action under the claim preclusion 
branch of res judicata. (Emphasis added). 
M a t 771-72. 
It is respectfully submitted that there is no distinguishable difference between the 
claims of the Appellant in the separate deficiency judgment case and the issues presented to 
the trial court in the Appellant's order to show cause and therefore claim preclusion should 
apply to bar the Appellant's attempt to re-litigate the matter in the order to show cause. 
POINT VIII: THIS COURT SHOULD ASSESS ATTORNEY 
FEES IN THIS MATTER 
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure allows for the assessment of 
damages and attorney fees when the determination is made that the appeal is frivolous. The 
Rule, in relevant part, states: 
(a). . . if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these 
rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may 
include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney 
fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order that the damages be paid by 
the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law 
(c) Procedures. (1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or 
upon its own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part 
of the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the 
appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other paper. (2) 
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If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court shall issue 
to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show cause why such 
damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause shall set forth the 
allegations which form the basis of the damages and permit at least ten days in 
which to respond unless otherwise ordered for good cause shown. The order to 
show cause may be part of the notice of oral argument. . . . 
With all due respect, the Appellee submits that the contents of the Appellant's appeal 
are legally insufficient on almost eveiy level. There was no real attempt to accurately 
establish the ruling and methodology of Judge Howard. The Appellant did not marshal the 
underlying facts in this case. The Appellant blatantly included and argued from evidence that 
is not part of the record in this case. As to the Appellant's only viable argument, change of 
circumstances, the Appellant knew that no petition or even a request had been made in these 
proceedings to modify the Corrected Decree. The issue was not included in any pleadings or 
arguments, 
Based upon the total absence of a viable theory to support an appeal and the direct 
violation the basic rules relating to the preparation of a brief, the Appellee should be entitled 
to reimbursement for his damages which include but are not limited to attorney fees and costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Preliminarily, this Court should hold that the Appellant had failed to marshal the 
evidence to adequately contest the factual findings of Judge Howard. Additionally, the Court 
should strike all evidence relied upon by the Appellant that has not been made part of the 
record on appeal. Further, the Court should not address the new issues raised by the Appellant 
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on appeal. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Court should determine that the relevant language 
in the Corrected Decree of Divorce is clear and unambiguous and under the terms thereof, the 
Appellee has no underlying obligation to the Appellant, on the trust deed and notes 
incorporated into the Corrected Decree. The Court should adjudge that the Appellee's 
position is supported by the one action rule and claim preclusion. 
Finally, Appellee requests that this Court uphold and sustain Judge Howard's ruling 
and order granting the Appellee's motion in limine and assess attorney fees against the 
Appellant in accordance with Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Dated this J^_ day of May, 2008. , i / I / , 
< 4L AYJA.. , y' 
John G. Mulliner / 
Attorney for Appellee 
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66 A " EXHIBIT "A 
CORRECTED FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
CORRECTED DECREE OF DIVORCE 
ORIGINAL 
CHARLES BRADFORD CARLSTON (6848) 
BRADFORD & BRADY, P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
389 North University Avenue ' 
Provo, Utah 84601 
(801) 374-6272 File No. 3581.02 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAMELA GIBBY, 
vs. 
RICHARD GIBBY, 
Petitioner, 
Respondent. 
CORRECTED 
FINDINGS OF FACT & 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 994400490
 n | x / | Q | r . K & 
Judge Fred D. Howard ^'VISION # _/_ 
This matter came on regularly before the Honorable Fred D. Howard. The Court had 
before it a Stipulation executed by the parties and Petitioner's counsel, in which the 
Respondent consented that his default could be entered and that the matter may be heard on the 
basis of the Petitioner's Complaint and the terms of the parties' Stipulation. The Court, after 
reviewing the Stipulation and pleadings on file herein, entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law as well as a Decree of Divorce on June 23, 1999. 
Shortly after that date, it came to the attention of the parties that the June 23, 1999 
Decree did not accurately reflect the Stipulation of the parties. Therefore, the Court does now 
make and enter the following Corrected Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
CORRECTED FINDINGS OF FACT 
JURISDICTION 
1. Petitioner was a resident of Utah County, State of Utah, for more than three (3) 
CORRECTED TINDINGS OP TACT 
Pigel of 12 
r»i o / 
months immediately preceding the filing of this action. 
2. Petitioner and Defendant are husband and wife, having been married on 
February 28, 1976, in Utah. 
3. During the course of the marriage, differences have arisen between the parties 
which differences are irreconcilable and have made the continuation of the marriage 
impossible. 
CHILDREN 
4. Hie p^ities have agreed f nai Petitioner shall have custody of -the- .following iwu 
(2) minor children, subject to Respondent's visitation according to the statutory minimum 
guidelines: 
A. JASON GIBBY (born December 29,1987) 
B. KYLE GIBBY(born November 18, 1992). 
CHILD SUPPORT 
5. The parties have agreed that, as and for child support, Respondent should be 
ordered to pay to Petitioner statutory child support until each child graduates from high school 
with his/her peers or reaches age 18, whichever later occurs. The parties agree that 
Respondent's initial obligation, as of June 1, 1999, will be $1,400.00 based on his 1998 
average monthly gross income of $10,000.00 and hers of 0.00, 
6. The parties have agreed that Respondent should be ordered to establish an 
interbank transfer or another type of direct deposit into a bank account of Petitioner's choice. 
Said transfer of funds shall occur on the 5Ul and 20th of each month. 
7. Otherwise, if the parties agree, Respondent shall provide to Petitioner at the 
CORRECTED FINDINGS OF FACT 
signing of this stipulation, checks dated the 5 and 20th of the following three months. By the 
end of each month, thereafter, Respondent shall, by the end of each month deliver to Petitioner 
checks appropriately dated such that she would have in hand at any one time three (3) months 
of support checks. 
PARENTING ISSUES 
8. Time-sharing Arrangement: Petitioner, PAMELA GIBBY, is hereby granted 
tm sole physical custody of thp two (2) milium children subject U; Re^pOiid^iii's spending time 
with the minors according to the statutory minimum guidelines. The parties are hereby 
ordered to work out between them a time-sharing calendar on a month-to-month basis using 
statutory guidelines. 
9. Decision-making: Both parties are hereby granted joint legal custody of the 
children. This means that Petitioner and Respondent will make joint decisions regarding all 
major decisions that may arise regarding the minor children. Major decisions will include 
decisions regarding the children's education, religious training, medical and dental care, and 
counseling. If an impasse is encountered, the parties are ordered to seek the advice of a 
mutually-agreeable expert and allow him/her to be the final decision-maker. 
10. The children's post-high-school expenses. In accordance with the stipulation of 
the parties, both parties shall use best efforts to share equally (50/50) the costs associated with 
the children's college tuition and expenses, missions, and weddings, except where Respondent 
has otherwise agreed to pay the full amount. 
CORRECTED FINDINGS OF FACT 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
11. The parties have agreed that each of the parties should be awarded the personal 
property now in his/her respective possession as a full and complete property settlement, 
subject to the following: 
property: 
A. The Petitioner should be awarded the following specific personal 
i. 1995 Suburban automobile free of any encumbrances 
ii. Vz t)f'&£ value (approximately $1 fi3'2/,QQ}iQ£M'^.d^x)Tr*YAvprf&v •'^ '•Of-W 
shares of Cimetrics stock. Upon receipt of her share (approximately $816.00) 
Petitioner should quit claim the shares to Respondent. 
B. The Respondent should be awarded the following specific personal 
property: 
i. Approximately 2,000 shares of Cimetrics stock.: 
ii. 1996 Dodge Ram Truck 4x4: 
iii. 1996 Seadoo Boat and Trailer; : 
iv. 1998 Angler (Fleetwood) Camper. 
C. Petitioner and Respondent have agreed that they should divide equally 
the net proceeds from the following when all encumbrances are resolved: 
1. Hanks note (approx. $28,000.00); 
2. Camino Cielo Property (uncertain amount) 
REAL PROPERTY 
12. The parties have agreed that marital real property of the parties should be 
CORRECTED FINDINGS OF FACT 
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awarded as follows: 
A. To the Petitioner: 
1. The home of the parties located at 49 North Country Lane (920 East), 
Orem, Utah 84057 (with a net equity of approximately $355,000.00); 
2. Vi of net from sale of 855 N. Freedom Blvd., Provo, UT. 
B. To the Respondent: 
• 410 Arenoso, San Clemente, California (Net equity: $500,500.00); 
*• 42f-Granada; San Clemente, California <Meteq* : ^48,t)00.00) 
• 527 So. State Street, Orem, Utah (Net equity: $41,000.00) 
• 241 East 2230 North, Provo, Utah (Net equity: 55,000.00); 
• 363 N. University Avenue, Provo, Utah (Net equity: $400,000.00);* 
• 855 North Freedom Blvd., Provo, Utah (Net equity: 108,000.00);* 
Vi of net from sale of 855 N. Freedom Blvd., Provo, UT (net: ?). 
Total net equity $1,552,500.00** 
Key: 
• = Note that these three (3) properties are subject to the notes identified in 
" Equalizing Payment", below. 
** Note that this total does not yet include Vi of the net from the sale of 855 
Freedom Blvd., Provo,) 
C. To equalize the distribution of marital property to the parties, the parties 
have agreed that Respondent will sign Promissory notes to Petitioner (see Equalizing Payment, 
below). 
SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS RE 557-559 E. 2000 SOUTH, OREM, PROPERTY. 
13. Petitioner and Respondent have agreed that, in the event that Respondent dies 
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before the life estate has been terminated by the death of both of Petitioner's parents, the 
property at 557-559 East 2000 South, Orem, Utah shall be deeded to Petitioner. 
EQUALIZING PAYMENT 
14. To equalize the marital real property settlement between the parties, the parties 
have agreed that 
A. Respondent, or the appropriate LLC, should be ordered to sign a 
Promissory note to*:?eritiofeerm*be, sum:f>f:$3$0:f900;00 S6cpf j^b:hy,- ,^t^ ^st..4^rf- i?? fjbfe s&me; 
amount on the property at 363 N., University Avenue, Provo, Utah 84601. The terms of the 
note should include a 7% interest rate on the principle amortized for 20 years. Payments on 
the note should be made to Petitioner on the 1st of each month beginning June 1, 1999. 
B. Respondent, or the appropriate LLC, should be ordered to sign a 
Promissory note to Petitioner in the sum of $50,000.00 secured by a trust deed in the same 
amount on the property at 855 N. Freedom Blvd., Provo, Utah 84601. The terms of the note 
should include a 7.5% interest rate on the principle amortized for 20 years. Payments on the 
note should be made to Petitioner on the 1st of each month beginning June 1, 1999. 
C. Respondent, or the appropriate LLC, should be ordered to sign a 
Promissory note to Petitioner in the sum of $90,750.00 secured by a trust deed in the same 
amount on the property at 424 Granada, San Clemente, California 92672. The terms of the 
note should include a 9% interest rate on the principle amortized for 20 years. Payments on 
the note will be made to Petitioner on the 5th of each month beginning June 1, 1999. 
Respondent agrees to a five (5) year call on the note. 
D. Respondent, or the appropriate LLC, should be ordered to list the 
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property at 855 N. Freedom Blvd., Provo, Utah 84601 for sale no later than June 1, 2003 for 
a price not to exceed a then-current appraisal amount. The parties have agreed that the house 
should close no later than June 1, 2004. Respondent, or the appropriate LLC, should be 
ordered to continue to make regular and timely loan payments including principle and interest. 
The parties agreed that they should divide equally the net proceeds from the sale of said 
property. The parties have agreed that net proceeds is defined as any proceeds realized over 
the amounts owed on the first and second trust deeds, including any and all principle reduction, 
less selling expenses-(i.e., closing costs, se;Kkig-eoM!mi£si9ii acit:ali>-p^dy,eia,); 
DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
15. Petitioner and Respondent have agreed that the debts of the parties should be 
allocated as follows: 
A. The Petitioner shall pay, and hold Respondent harmless therefrom, the 
following debts: 
1. Those incurred by Petitioner after May 12, 
B. The Respondent should pay, and hold the Petitioner harmless therefrom, 
the following debts: 
1. Bonneville - approximately $50,000; 
2. MBNA Platinum Plus credit card - approximately $17,000.00 
(this is to be paid off as soon as possible);MBNA credit card - approximately 
$8,000.00; Dr. Wiest (dentist) - approximately $1,300.00; 
3. Dr. Aurthur (dentist) - approximately $2,000.00; 
4. American Express credit card - approximately $5,000.00; 
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5. MT America loan (for Rick's truck) - approximately $5,900.00; 
6. SCI (burial plot for Rick's parents) - approximately $3,900.00; and 
7. Dr. Watson (counseling) - approximately $2,150.00. 
8. Each, of the parties shall be responsible for any debts incurred by 
him/her after May 12, 1999. 
16. The parties have also agreed that Respondent may use the proceeds from a certain 
lawsuit (against the title company regarding a Universal Campus Credit Union loan) to pay off 
4-l*e f o l l o w i n g H,?hls 
A. Those debts enumerated in 18(b) above, incurred prior to May 12, 1999, 
including the costs of servicing the debts through May 12, 1999; 
B. Any other expenses on the leased Neon automobile currently used by the 
children other than gas, including the costs of terminating the lease when it is up; 
C. All of Petitioner's attorney fees and costs in completing her divorce 
action; and 
D. Remaining proceeds from the lawsuit will be divided equally between 
the parties. 
17. The parties have agreed that they shall split 50/50 the lease and insurance on 
the Neon automobile currently used by the children. 
SPOUSAL SUPPORT 
18. The parties have agreed that Petitioner shall use her best efforts to rent the 
apartment above the garage at Petitioner's residence. Said rent will be used to pay part of the 
mortgage on Petitioner's home at 49 North Country Lane (920 East), Orem, Utah 84097. The 
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parties have agreed that Respondent shall reimburse Petitioner for one-half (V2) (approximately 
$1,355.54 currently) of the remaining monthly principle, interest, taxes, and insurance 
payments on the residence for the months of June, July and August 1999 or until the apartment 
is rented — whichever occurs first. 
19. Thereafter, Respondent shall reimburse Petitioner for one-half (Vi) 
(approximately $1,058.04 currently) of the remaining monthly principle, interest, taxes, and 
insurance payments on the residence for three (3) years or until the house sells, whichever 
nccurs?firs<"///^l»paitkA;iiav^..A.gmed that n$s shall be paicjra^^ddltiorial alimony to .^tkione^ 
20. Petitioner and Respondent have agreed that the Respondent shall pay to 
Petitioner as Spousal Support the following amounts: 
a. $2,150.00 each month for 10 years or until Petitioner's remarriage or death; 
b. $1,355.54 for the months of June, July and August 1999 or until the 
apartment above Petitioner's garage is rented - whichever occurs first; 
c. $1,058.04 per month until May 31, 2002 or until Petitioner's residence 
sells, whichever occurs first. 
21. The parties have agreed that Respondent shall establish an interbank transfer or 
another type of direct deposit into a bank account of Petitioner's choice. Said transfer of funds 
shall occur on the 5th and 20th of each month. 
22. Otherwise, if the parties agree, Respondent shall provide to Petitioner at the 
signing of this stipulation, checks dated the 5lh and 20th of the following three months. By the 
end of each month, thereafter, Respondent shall, by the end of each month deliver to Petitioner 
checks appropriately dated such that she would have in hand at any one time three (3) months 
of support checks. 
CORRECTED FINDINGS OF FACT 
HEALTH INSURANCE AND UNINSURED EXPENSES 
23. Petitioner and Respondent have agreed that Respondent shall provide health 
insurance coverage for the two (2) minor children at his sole expense. Both parties have 
agreed that they shall share equally (50/50) all uninsured medical expenses, including medical, 
dental, optical, and counseling. 
24. The parties have agreed that Petitioner shall pay up front directly to the 
provider her one-half (Vi) of uninsured medical, dental, optical, and counseling expenses. The 
parties ;wy!;^^ 
dental, optical and counseling expenses. 
LIFE INSURANCE 
25. Both parties have agreed that Respondent will maintain term life insurance on his 
life in the amount of $500,000.00 -- for as long as Respondent has an obligation to Petitioner for 
child support, spousal support and/or the promissory note - with Petitioner as the sole 
beneficiary. Respondent shall, further, provide to Petitioner proof of payment of premiums and 
shall instruct the insurance carrier to immediately notify Petitioner prior to declaring the policy 
in default for any reason. 
TAXES 
26. Petitioner and Respondent have agreed that they should equally divide any tax 
refund forthcoming for the past tax year. 
27. The parties have agreed that Petitioner as the home-based parent, will be awarded 
the tax exemptions for the eligible children. However, the parties have also agreed that Petitioner 
will sign over the exemptions to Respondent from tax year to tax year subject to the following 
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conditions: 
A. That Respondent is current in his child support and other obligations; and 
B. That Respondent pay to Petitioner the tax benefit she would have had had 
she claimed the exemptions on her tax returns. 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
28. The parties have agreed that Respondent should pay all attorney's fees and costs 
acsociiivCd* villi this *J:ivoi*je 9-Cii^ *!. 
MISCELLANEOUS 
29. The parties have agreed that this Stipulation shall be a full and complete settlement 
of all claims running between the parties as of this date, subject to the express condition that the 
financial data that has been provided by Respondent to Petitioner and her attorney is both complete 
and accurate. 
30. The parties have agreed that the Respondent has been informed that Charles 
Bradford Carlston, counsel for Petitioner, cannot and will not act as counsel for him in this matter. 
31. That the Respondent does not desire to retain counsel to represent him in this matter 
and has agreed to all the items mentioned in the Stipulation of his own free will. 
32. The parties have agreed that the provisions of this Agreement shall not be modified 
or changed except by mutual consent and agreement of the parties expressed in writing. 
33. The parties have agreed that this Agreement shall be binding upon the parties and 
the respective heirs, executors, administrators and assigns. 
34. Both the Petitioner and Respondent have acknowledged that they have read and 
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reviewed the Stipulation and have represent that the Agreement was entered into voluntarily and 
that the Stipulation should be a full and complete settlement of all claims running between the 
parties of this date. 
Having entered its Findings of Fact, the Court hereby enters the following Conclusions of 
Law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. rJlic C'jun h^ L jurisdiction ovei ih^^riie* lit *-»-w»M.w-r>7iit!r.i *T,?.ttrf 
2. Petitioner is entitled to a Decree of Divorce divorcing her from the Respondent 
upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
3. Said Decree of Divorce should become final and absolute immediately upon its 
filing and entry in the office of the clerk of the court. 
4. The parties are entitled to have the forgoing Findings of Fact incorporated into 
their Conclusions of Law. 
Respondent Pro Se 
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UHltilNAL 
Charles Bradford Carlston (6848) 
BRADFORD & BRADY, P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
389 North University Ayenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
(801) 374-6272 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAMELA GIBBY, 
vs. 
RICHARD GIBBY, 
-Pp; if tuner,.. 
Respondent. J 
CORRECTED DIVORCE DECREE 
Civil Mr, 094400490 
Judge Fred Howard 
DIVISION # J 2 _ 
This matter came on regularly before the Honorable Fred D. Howard. The Court had 
before it a Stipulation executed by the parties and Petitioner's counsel, in which the Respondent 
consented that his default could be entered and that the matter may be heard on the basis of the 
Petitioner's Complaint and the terms of the Stipulation. The Court, after reviewing the Stipulation 
and pleadings on file herein, entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as well as a 
Decree of Divorce. Shortly after that time, it has come to the attention of the parties that the 
June 23, 1999 Decree of Divorce did not accurately reflect the Stipulation of the parties 
Therefore, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
CORRECTED DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. Petitioner, PAMELA GIBBY, is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce divorcing 
her from the Respondent, RICHARD GIBBY, upon the grounds that irreconcilable differences 
have arisen between the parties, making continuation of the marriage impossible. 
File No. 3581.02 
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2. Said Decree of Divorce shall become final and absolute immediately upon its 
filing and entry in the office of the clerk of the Court. 
CHILDREN 
3. The Court hereby orders thai Petitioner shall have sole physical custody of the 
following two (2) minor children, subject to the statutory minimum guidelines: 
a. JASON GIBBY (born December 29,1987) 
b. KYLE GI3BY(bor:i November 18, laQ?)> 
CHILD SUPPORT 
4. As and for child support, Respondent is ordered to pay to Petitioner statutory 
child support until each child graduates from high school with his/her peers or reaches age 18, 
whichever later occurs. Respondent's initial obligation, as of June 1, 1999, will be $1,400.00 
based on his current monthly gross income of $10,000.00 and hers of 0.00. 
5. Respondent is ordered to establish an interbank transfer or another type of direct 
deposit into a bank account of Petitioner's choice. Said transfer of funds shall occur on the 5th 
and 20lh of each month. 
6. Otherwise, if the parties agree, Respondent shall provide to Petitioner at the 
signing of this stipulation, checks dated the 5th and 20th of the following three months. By the 
end of each month, thereafter, Respondent shall, by the end of each month deliver to Petitioner 
checks appropriately dated such that she would have in hand at any one time three (3) months 
of support checks 
DECRIX or DIVORCE 
PARENTING ISSUES 
7. Time-sharing Arrangement: Petitioner, PAMELA GIBBY, is hereby granted 
the sole physical custody of the two (2) minor children subject to Respondent's spending time 
with the minors according to the statutory minimum guidelines. The parties are hereby 
ordered to work out between them a time-sharing calendar on a month-to-month basis using 
statutory guidelines. 
8. Decision-making: Both parties are hereby granted joint legal custody of the 
cniidren. This mans- ihaiTetiliener diid P.c^poiident xvilh mti^ yjiDlAcci^^tir-^^g^-h^ ***, 
major decisions that may arise regarding the minor children. Major decisions will include 
decisions regarding the children's education, religious training, medical and dental care, and 
counseling. If an impasse is encountered, the parties are ordered to seek the advice of a 
mutually-agreeable expert and allow him/her to be the final decision-maker. 
9. The children's post-high-school expenses: In accordance with the stipulation of 
the parties, both parties shall use best efforts to share equally (50/50) the costs associated with 
the children's college tuition and expenses, missions, and weddings, except where Respondent 
has otherwise agreed to pay the full amount. 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
10. Each of the parties is awarded the personal property now in his/her respective 
possession as a full and complete property settlement, subject to the following: 
a. The Petitioner is awarded the following specific personal property: 
(i) 1995 Suburban automobile free of any encumbrances 
DCCRCCOI DIVORCE 
(ii) Vi of the value (approximately $1,632.00) of the approximately 
2,000 shares of Cimetrics stock. Upon receipt of her share (approximately 
$816.00) Petitioner is ordered to quit claim the shares to Respondent. 
b. The Respondent is awarded the following specific personal property: 
(i) Approximately 2,000 shares of Cimetrics stock.: 
(ii) 1996 Dodge Ram Truck 4x4: 
(iii) 1996 Seadoo Boat and Trailer; : 
\h7) -i-9981 AtigtaH;:R^t^eec») Camper.-
11. Petitioner and Respondent are hereby ordered to divide equally the net proceeds 
from the following when all encumbrances are resolved: 
a. Hanks note (approx $28,000.00); 
b. Camino Cielo Property (uncertain amount) 
REAL PROPERTY 
The Court hereby orders the marital real property of the parties distributed as 
a. To the Petitioner 
1. The home of the parties located at 49 North Country Lane (920 
East), Orem, Utah 84057 (with a net equity of approximately 
$355,000.00); 
2. Vi of net from sale of 855 N. Freedom Blvd., Provo, UT. 
b. To the Respondent: 
• 410 Arenoso, San Clemente, California (Net equity: $500,500.00); 
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12. 
follows: 
424 Granada, San Clemente, California (Net equity: $448,000.00);* 
527 So. State Street, Orem, Utah (Net equity: $41,000.00) 
241 East 2230 North, Provo, Utah (Net equity: 55,000.00); 
363 N. University Avenue, Provo, Utah (Net equity: $400,000.00);* 
855 North Freedom Blvd., Provo, Utah (Net equity: 108,000.00);* 
V2 of net from sale of 855 N. Freedom Blvd., Provo, UT (net: ?). 
Total net equity $1,552,500.00** 
Y* 
* = Note that these three (3) properties are subject to the notes identified in 
"Equalizing Payment", below. 
** Note that this total does not yet include lh of the net from the sale of 855 
Freedom Blvd., Provo,) 
c. To equalize the distribution of marital property to the parties, Respondent 
will sign Promissory notes to Petitioner (see Equalizing Payment, below); 
SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS RE 557-559 E. 2000 SOUTH, OREM, PROPERTY 
13. The Court hereby orders that, in the event that Respondent dies before the life 
estate has been terminated by the death of both of Petitioner's parents, the property at 557-559 
East 2000 South, Orem, Utah shall be deeded to Petitioner. 
EQUALIZING PAYMENT 
14. To equalize the marital real property settlement between the parties: 
a. Respondent, or the appropriate LLC, is hereby ordered to sign a 
Promissory note to Petitioner in the sum of $390,000.00 secured by a trust deed in the 
same amount on the property at 363 N., University Avenue, Provo, Utah 84601. The 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
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terms of the note will include a 7% interest rate on the principle amortized for 20 years. 
Payments on the note will be made to Petitioner on the 1st of each month beginning 
June 1, 1999. 
b. Respondent, or the appropriate LLC, is hereby ordered to sign a 
Promissory note to Petitioner in the sum of $50,000.00 secured by a trust deed in the 
same amount on the property at 855 N. Freedom Blvd., Provo, Utah 84601. The terms 
of the note will include a 7.5% interest rate on the principle amortized for 20 years. 
Payment!: t>n the IYA? <*'lil be mad*" .^--Metitianer on rj^ r )$T or oao- rr^Tnrh-hr^i^insr 
June 1, 1999. 
c. Respondent, or the appropriate LLC, is hereby ordered to sign a 
Promissory note to Petitioner in the sum of $90,750,00 secured by a trust deed in the 
same amount on the property at 424 Granada, San Clemente, California 92672. The 
terms of the note will include a 9% interest rate on the principle amortized for 20 years. 
Payments on the note will be made to Petitioner on the 5th of each month beginning 
June 1, 1999. Respondent agrees to a five (5) year call on the note. 
d. Respondent, or the appropriate LLC, is hereby ordered to list the 
property at 855 N. Freedom Blvd., Provo, Utah 84601 for sale no later than June 1, 
2003 for a price not to exceed a then-current appraisal amount. It shall close no later 
than June 1, 2004. Respondent, or the appropriate LLC, is hereby ordered to continue 
to make regular and timely loan payments including principle and interest. The parties 
are hereby ordered to divide equally the net proceeds from the sale of said property. 
Net proceeds is defined as any proceeds realized over the amounts owed on the first and 
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second trust deeds, including any and all principle reduction, less selling expenses (i.e., 
closing costs, selling commission actually paid, etc.). 
DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
15. The Court hereby orders that the debts of the parties should be allocated as 
follows: 
a. The Petitioner shall pay, and hold the Respondent harmless therefrom, 
die foj lowing dcbib. 
(i) Those incurred by Petitioner after May 12, 1999. 
b. The Respondent shall pay, and hold the Petitioner harmless therefrom, 
the following debts: 
(i) Bonneville - approximately $50,000; 
(ii) MBNA Platinum Plus credit card - approximately $17,000.00 (this 
is to be paid off as soon as possible); 
(iii) MBNA credit card - approximately $8,000.00; 
(iv) Dr. Wiest (dentist) - approximately $1,300.00; 
(y) Dr. Aurthur (dentist) - approximately $2,000.00; 
(vi) American Express credit card - approximately $5,000.00; 
(vii) MT America loan (for Rick's truck) - approximately $5,900.00; 
(viii) SCI (burial plot for Rick's parents) - approximately $3,900.00; 
and 
(ix) Dr. Watson (counseling) - approximately $2,150.00. 
DECREE Of DIVORCr 
Page 7 of 11 
r* < t\ r* 
(x) Each of the parties shall be responsible for any debts incurred by 
him/her after May 12, 1999. 
16. The Court also orders that Respondent may use the proceeds from a certain 
lawsuit (against the title company regarding a Universal Campus Credit Union loan) to pay off 
the following debts: 
a. Those debts enumerated in 18(b) above, incurred prior to May 12, 1999, 
including the costs of servicing the debts through May 12, 1999; 
Um f^uy VLLICL eXpClibud uii uiu lodaCta iNuun adtOiliwbiiC CuixCiltlj u.oC\l uj tiio 
children other than gas, including the costs of terminating the lease when it is up; 
c. All of Petitioner's attorney fees and costs in completing her divorce 
action, and 
d. Remaining proceeds from the lawsuit will be divided equally between 
the parties. 
17. The parties are hereby ordered to split 50/50 the lease and insurance on the 
Neon automobile currently used by the children. 
SPOUSAL SUPPORT 
18. Petitioner is hereby ordered to use her best efforts to rent the apartment above 
the garage at Petitioner's residence. Said rent will be used to pay part of the mortgage on 
Petitioner's home at 49 North Country Lane (920 East), Orem, Utah 84097. Respondent is 
ordered to reimburse Petitioner for one-half (Vi) (approximately $1,355.54 currently) of the 
remaining montlily principle, interest, taxes, and insurance payments on the residence for the 
months of June, July and August 1999 or until the apartment is rented - whichever occurs 
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first. Thereafter, Respondent shall reimburse Petitioner for one-half (Vi) (approximately 
$1,058.04 currently) of the remaining monthly principle, interest, taxes, and insurance 
payments on the residence for three (3) years or until the house sells, whichever occurs first. 
This shall be paid as additional alimony to Petitioner. 
19. Respondent is hereby ordered to pay to Petitioner as Spousal Support the 
following amounts: 
a. $2,150.00 each month for 10 years or until Petitioner's remarriage or 
b. $1,355.54 for the months of June, July and August 1999 or until the 
apartment above Petitioner's garage is rented - whichever occurs first; 
c. $1,058.04 per month until May 31, 2002 or until Petitioner's residence 
sells, whichever occurs first. 
20. Respondent is ordered to establish an interbank transfer or another type of direct 
deposit into a bank account of Petitioner's choice. Said transfer of funds shall occur on the 5th 
and 20lh of each month. 
21. Otherwise, if the parties agree, Respondent shall provide to Petitioner at the 
signing of this stipulation, checks dated the 5th and 20th of the following three months. By the 
end of each month, thereafter, Respondent shall, by the end of each month deliver to Petitioner 
checks appropriately dated such that she would have in hand at any one time three (3) months 
of support checks. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
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HEALTH INSURANCE AND UNINSURED EXPENSES 
22. Respondent is hereby ordered to provide health insurance coverage for the two 
(2) minor children at his sole expense. Both parties are ordered to share equally (50/50) all 
uninsured medical expenses, including medical, dental, optical, and counseling. 
23. The Court further orders Petitioner to pay up front directly to the provider her 
one-half (Vi) of uninsured medical, dental, optical, and counseling expenses. The parties are 
ordered to arrange for the provider to bill Respondent for the remainder of uninsured medical, 
dental, cpnea;, ana counseling expenses. 
LIFE INSURANCE 
24. The Court further orders Respondent to maintain term life insurance on his life in 
the amount ol $500,000.00 -- for as long as Respondent has an obligation to Petitioner for child 
support, spousal support and/or the promissory note - with Petitioner as the sole beneficiary. 
Respondent is further ordered to provide to Petitioner proof of payment of premiums and to 
instruct the insurance carrier to immediately notify Petitioner prior to declaring the policy in 
default for any reason. 
TAXES 
25. The parties are ordered to equally divide any tax refund forthcoming for the past 
(1998) tax year. 
26. The Court further orders that Petitioner, as the home-based parent, be awarded the 
tax exemptions for the eligible children. However, Petitioner may sign over the exemptions to 
Respondent from tax year to tax year subject to the following conditions: 
a. That Respondent is current in his child support and other obligations; and 
DECREE Or DIVORCE 
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b. That Respondent pay to Petitioner the tax benefit she would have had had 
she claimed the exemptions on her tax returns. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
27. The Court further orders Respondent to pay all attorney' s fees and costs associated 
with this divorce action. 
28. The Court further orders both parties to cooperate fully in executing any and all 
documents required in order to folly implement thic Decree yi" Divorce.-
DATED th is /2^iay of ^ < < S s % ^ f , 2000. 
BY THE COURT: -^^J^,-
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
RICHARD GIBBY Respondent Pro Se 
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U T ^ > " EXHIBIT "B 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN THE DEFICIENCY 
ACTION 
a 
Rosemond Blakelock #£ 
Attorney for Responds 
75 South 300 West 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 375-7678 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAMELA GIDDY,- * 
-A 
Plaintiff, * 
v. * 
* 
RICHARD GIBBY, * 
Defendant. * 
This matter came before the Court, as for oral arguments, 
following the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court 
having read Defendant's the Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, having read the Response of the Plaintiff, 
having heard oral arguments, having examined the file and the 
contents therein and deeming itself to be fully informed in the 
premises, orders and rules as follows; 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. The Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and the 
case is hereby dismissed against the Defendant, with prejudice. 
FILED 
fourth Judicial District Court 
County, State of Utah 
% 
°W 
~~4~^—~ .D&puty 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
U31'A 
2. The Court finds that is not disputed that the Defendant 
signed all documents on behalf of the LLC and did not sign any 
documents m a personal capacity. 
3. The Court finds that the terms of the parties' Decree of 
Divorce is not a question before the Court. 
4. The Court find that the Defendant signed all Notes and 
documents in this matter on behalf of the LLC and did not sign 
any documents in a personal capacity. The Court finds that it is 
unpersuaded that the Defendant bears any personal liability in 
this matter. 
5. The Court finds that U.C.A.§ 48-2c-104 is clear in that 
it provides that "[a] company formed under this chapter is a 
legal entity distinct from it's members". 
6. The Court finds that because this is a deficiency action, 
that the Court can grant leave to allow the Plaintiff to bring a 
separate motion to bring an action against the LLC. 
7. The Court is persuaded that this present action does not 
impose personal liability against Mr. Richard Gibby and further 
finds that Richard Gibby had no personal liability in this 
matter. 
8. The Court finds that the Defendant is entitled to an 
award of attorney's fees in this matter and grants the Defendant 
2 
a judgment as for his attorney's fees in the amount of 
$ B^a?. no . 
9. Because there does not appear to be any question that Mr. 
Gibby did not have any personal liability in this matter, the 
Court then considered and accepted the Defendant's arguments that 
this action was not made in good faith. However, in order to be 
fair to both parties, the court hereby grants Plaintiff's counsel 
two weeks to file a Memorandum, regarding any authority he may 
wish to cite, which support his contention that the action was 
filed in good faith. The Defendant shall then have five days to 
respond and the Court shall, at that time, issue the appropriate 
orders as to attorney's fees. 
DATED this "Z"Z day of (jUM€> , 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
/S/ FRED a HOWARD 
Judge Fred Howard 
Di s t r i c t Court Judge 
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NOTICE TO COUNSEL, Gary Weight 
TO: Gary Weight 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box >XL" 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
You will please take notice that he undersigned attorney for 
Respondent will submit the above and foregoing Order to the Court 
:or .gn t'linuian1: t o Rule ( t > ( *' ) O 1 lT1-^h Pi of 
Civil Procedure any objection as to the form of the order should 
be filed with the Court, within five days after service upon you 
of this notice. A 
DATED this^ day of I' /L 2004 
/ 
/ 
/ 
ROBEMON 
Attarrrey 
sTCBLAKETOCir* 
for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
a 
this //\ / th day of March 2005, I mailed a copy of the 
jCs^f Weight at the above listed address, via first class 
EXHIBIT "C" 
JUDGE HOWARD'S ORDER 
GRANTING APPELLEE'S MOTION 
IN LIMINE 
Rosemond G. Blakelock #6183 
Attorney for Defendant 
75 South 300 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 379-0700 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UT4H 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
District Court 
JUL I ? 2006 
State of Utah 
FILED Clerk *=-
PAMELA GIBBY, 
Plaintiff, 
RICHARD GIBBY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION IN 
LIMINE 
Case No. 040403686 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
This matter comes before the Court on Respondent's Motion in Limine. The Court, 
having reviewed the file and being fully advised in the premises, hereby issues the following 
RULING 
1. The Court notes that Respondent filed a Motion in Limine to Preclude the Introduction 
of Evidence with an accompanying memorandum on April 21, 2006. Petitioner filed a Response 
fKRfi 
on May 30, 2006. Respondent filed a Reply Memorandum on June 14, 2006. On June 21, 2006, 
a hearing on Respondent's Motion in Limine was held before the Court. 
2. Respondent asserts that Petitioner's claim relating to the $390,000.00 trust deed note 
has been adjudicated to conclusion against Petitioner in a companion civil case and, based upon 
the principle of claim preclusion, Petitioner is barred from relitigating the claim in this action. 
Respondent argues that he has no underlying obligation to Petitioner upon which a judgment 
could be based because he fulfilled the obligations described in Paragraph 14 of the Amended 
Decree by signing a promissory note and trust deed as a member and manager of New West 
Properties, LLC. Additionally, Respondent argues that Utah's One Action Rule prohibits any 
further action by Petitioner upon debts against the LLC and Respondent related to the property in 
question. 
3. Petitioner responds that the terms of the Corrected Decree of Divorce create an 
obligation upon Respondent to assure that Petitioner is given her fair share of the marital estate. 
Petitioner argues that Respondent has a personal obligation that cannot be transferred to someone 
else to carry the terms of the Decree with respect to his obligation to give to Petitioner her fair 
share of the marital estate. Petitioner argues that Respondent's Motion in Limine fails because 
the issues in the divorce case are not the same as the issues raised and decided in the separate 
civil action between the parties. Petitioner argues that it would be a violation of the principles of 
equity and fairness to allow Respondent to liquidate a marital asset and keep for himself the 
equity which rightfully belongs to Petitioner. 
4. The question before the Court is whether Respondent's action of signing a promissory 
note to Petitioner, on behalf of New West Properties, LLC, in the sum of $390,000.00 secured by 
a trust deed in the same amount on the property at 363 N. University Avenue, discharged 
Respondent's obligation to Petitioner as a matter of law. It is clear from a review of this matter 
and th* O ^ e c t H Divorce Decree that the parties were the owners of substantial properties at the 
time of their divorce. By all appearances, the parties intended to divide the properties with a fair 
and equalizing approach. The scheme the parties used to divide and equalize their properties 
included the execution and recording of a trust deed. Trust deeds are accompanied by a host of 
legal rights, including rights encompassed in the trust deed statute and other rights grounded in 
case precedent. The Court finds that, by tender of the promissory note and trust deed from New 
West Properties, LLC, Petitioner's equitable remedies in the divorce action were reduced to legal 
remedies, many of which legal remedies are superior to other remedies available under the law. 
5. The Court notes that the Corrected Decree of Divorce was signed by the Court and 
entered on March 17, 2000. The next month, on April 24, 2000, the trust deed contemplated by 
Paragraph 14 of the Corrected Decree and executed on September 2, 1999 by Richard Gibby as 
Manager of New West Properties, LLC was recorded by the Utah County Recorder's Office. The 
portion of Paragraph 14 of the Corrected Decree pertaining to Petitioner's claim in this matter 
reads as follows: 
To equalize the marital real property settlement between the parties: 
a. Respondent, or the appropriate LLC, is hereby ordered to sign a 
r* / £ / 
Promissory note to Petitioner in the sum of $390,000.00 secured by 
a trust deed in the same amount on the property at 363 N., [sic] 
University Avenue, Provo, Utah 84601. The terms of the note 
will include a 7% interest rate on the principle [sic] amortized for 20 years. 
Payments on the note will be made to Petitioner on the 1st of each month 
beginning June 1, 1999 (emphasis added). 
6. The Court finds that because the Corrected Decree gave Respondent the option of either 
personally signing the Promissory note and trust deed or signing the instruments on behalt of the 
LLC, Respondent fulfilled his obligation to Petitioner when he complied with Paragraph 14. In 
effects, Petitioner has already been "paid" her fair share of the marital estate because she elected to 
accept such form of payment which included valuable rights and remedies described in the 
Promissory Note and Trust Deed. Furthermore, not only did Petitioner accept the valuable rights 
when she accepted the Promissory Note and Trust Deed from New West Properties, LLC, but it is 
undisputed that she also recognized and exercised such rights when she chose to subordinate her 
interest in the University Avenue property and later foreclosure on the trust deed. 
7. In reviewing the Corrected Decree, the Court finds that nowhere in the decree is there 
language that suggests an additional personal guaranty from Mr. Gibby for the $390,000.00 
promissory note amount. The Court finds that equitable remedies are no longer available to 
Petitioner with regard to her claim for $390,000.00 because she obtained bargained-for legal rights 
in connection with her claim as described, and pursued the legal remedies available to her when she 
foreclosed on the trust deed. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
Based on the above analysis, and for the reasons set forth by Respondent, the Court grants 
Respondent's Motion in Limine and orders that the Petitioner's claims relating to the $390,000.00 
trust Deed Note have been adjudicated and are hereby barred from being brought before the Court 
for any additional requests for relief. 
Signed and Dated tbi« / 2 day of cfu^~/ 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
O / c; 7 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
GARY WEIGHT 
Gary Weight 
290 West Center Street 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603 
RULE 7 NOTICE 
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Petitioner has submitted the 
above and foregoing Order to the Court, for signature. Pursuant to Rule 7 (f)(2) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, any objection to the form of the Order should be filed with the Court, within five 
days after service upon you of this notice. 
DATED this 10th day of July, 2006. 
ROSAMOND BLAKEf OCK 
Attorney for Respondent 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of July, 2006,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing documents to the person(s) addressed above 
.egafAssistantf \ 1 \ A 
